RECENT CASES.
BILLS AND NOTEs-ALTERATION OF DATE-Ten persons made a joint and

several note. Afterwards one of the makers without the consent of the others
changed the date of the note. The indorsee of the payee brought suit.
Held: He may recover only against the party that made the alteration. Barton Savings Bank and Trust Co. v. Stephenson, 89 At. Rep. 639 (Vt. 1914).
In this case, the Negotiable Instruments Act, Vt. Acts of 1912, No. 99,
did not apply as the note was made before the act was passed. By the Law
Merchant, the innocent purchaser of a note which has been altered materially
gets no title as against those who sign before the alteration is made, as they
are not parties to the instrument which the holder received. Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 320 (Eng. 179), Paine v. Edsell, ig Pa.'i78 (1852). It necessarily follows that the person making the change, or authorizing it, cannot
complain that the paper has been altered. Schmelz v. Rix, 95 Va. 509 (1898).
When the alteration is made by a stranger to the paper, the general attitude
in the United States is that the holder may treat the alteration as a nullity,
and sue on the paper as -itvasoriginally. Equitable Manufacturing Co. v.
Allen, 76 Vt. 22 (1903). The alteration must be of a material part of the
instrument; date or time of payment, Hartley v. Carboy, i5o Pa. 231 (1892) ;
amount, Aetna Bank v. Winchester, 43 Conn. 391 (1876); rate of interest,
Gettysburg Bank v. Chisholm, 169 Pa. 564 (895); place of payment, Simpson v. Stackhouse, 9 Pa. 186 (1848); Neff v. Horner, 63 Pa. 327 (1869). But
if the alteration, though material, can be shown to have been made to correct a mutual mistake, it does not affect the validity of the paper. Ames v.
Colburn, 77 Mass. 390 (1858). An alteration of an immaterial part of the
paper does not avoid the bill or note: noting residences of indorsers on bill,
Struthers v. Kendall, 41 Pa. 214 (1861) ; changing the number of note, Comm.
v. Emigrant Bank, 98 Mass. 12 (1876).
The Negotiable Instruments Act, Pa. Act of 19Ol, P. L. 194, Sec. 124,
changes the earlier law and allows the" innocent purchaser to recover from
persons signing before the alteration according to the original tenor of the
paper. In other respects, the Act on this subject does not change the Law
Merchant.
.BILLS AND NOTES-BONA-FIDE HOLDER-GAMBLING DEBT-The maker of
a note executed in settlement of a gambling debt induced the plaintiff to
become the holder by representing that the note was valid and would be
paid. Held: Although the statute, §§ 1955, 1956, 1957, declare that any note
given in consideration of a gambling debt shall be void, where the makers
'asserted the validity of such a note and thus induced the plaintiff to purchase it in good faith, they are estopped to deny its illegality. Holzbog v.
Bakrow, 16o S. W. Rep. 792 (Ky. 1913).
This decision is in accord with the current of authority, similar statutes
being in force in most jurisdictions. Finn v. Barclay, 15 Ala. 626 (1849);
Blades v. Newman, 43 S. W. 176 (Ky. 1897); Dow v. Higgins, 72 Ill. App. 305
(1897) ; contra, Hurlburt v. Straub, 46 N. E. Rep. 163 (W. Va. 1903). But
the estoppel cannot be invoked in favor of the original payee, or anyone who
stands in his shoes, having had notice of the infirmity. Colby v. Title Ins.
Co., i6o Cal. 632 (19I1); Embery v. Jamison, 136 U. S. 336 (i89o). And
where the maker has not estopped himself, the infirmity of the note may be
shown against a bona-fide holder. Bank v. Brown, IOI Ky. 356 (1897); New
v. Walker, io8 Ind. 365 (i886); Western Nat. Bank v. State Bank, 70 Pac.
Rep. 439 (Colo. 1902); Griffiths v. Sears, 112 Pa. 523 (oooo).
Several jurisdictions, notably Pennsylvania, hold that a note given in
a stock gambling transaction is not subject to this last rule, and that a bona
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fide holder can recover against the maker. Northern National Bank v. Arnold, 187 Pa. 356 (1898) ; Myers v. Kessler, 142 Fed. Rep. 730 (19o6); Long's
Estate v. Jones, 69 Ill. App. 615 (1897); Higginbotham v. McGready, 8i S.
W. Rep. 883 (Mo. i9o4). The basis of these decisions is that notes given
for this purpose do not come within the scope of the statutes making those
given for the satisfaction of gambling debts void.
CIVIL PROCEDURE-WHo FXEmPT FRom SERVICE OF PRocEss-A non-resident under bail who enters a jurisdiction to answer to a criminal charge is
not exempt from the service of process in a civil action, if the criminal action was bona fide and not a subterfuge to get the defendant within the jurisdiction of the court. Ex parte Hendersen, I45 N. W. Rep. 574 (N. D. 1914)
It is clear that a non-resident witness who has come into the jurisdiction to testify in any authorized legal proceeding is exempt from service of
process in a civil action instituted against him personally or against any corporation or person of whom he may be the representative. Hardwood Mfg.
Co. v. Kinsey, 94 N. Y. S. 455 (i9o5) ; Fidelity Co. v. Everett, 97 Ga. 787
(1896). It has been held that only such witnesses as are serving under subpoenas are granted the court's protection. Fertilizer Co. v. Kirsh, 24 Ky.
L. R. 2471 (19o3). But exemption has, almost universally, been granted to
all witnesses. Jones v. Knauss, 31 N. J. Eq. 211 (1879). As to exemption of
parties to an action from service of process, there has been a greater difference of opinion. The general rule is that parties to an action whether
plaintiff or defendant are exempt. Cameron v. Roberts, 87 Wis. 291 (894);
Morrow v. Dudley & Co., i44 Fed. Rep. 44I (igo6). Distinction has been
made between a party plaintiff, who is submitting to the jurisdiction for his
own advantage, and a defendant who is forced to attend to preserve his rights.
Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. I (1858); Wilson Machine Co. v. Wilson, 5i Conn.
595 (1884). This distinction has been denied by the cases above where all
parties are exempt and by another court which has held none exempt. Baldwin v. Emerson, 16 R.LI. 3o4 (1888).
In accord with the proposition that the defendant in a criminal action
is not exempt from service of process in a civil action while he
is in the jurisdiction to face the criminal charge are Netograph
Co. v. Scrugham, 197 N. Y. 377 (19io) ; Commonwealth v. Huntzinger, 2 Leg.
Rec. Rep. 8o (Pa. 1881). The plaintiff in an attachment suit, who has entered the jurisdiction to avoid forfeiting his bond, given in that action is
also liable to be served with process in a civil action. Mullen v. Sanborn,
But the defendant in a criminal action, entering the
79 Md. 364 (894).
jurisdiction either to waive extradition or entering voluntarily or to avoid
forfeiture of a bail bond, has often been held exempt from service of process. Murray v. Wilcox, 122 Ia. i88 (I9O4); Kaufman v. Garner, 173 Fed.
Rep. 550 (i9o9)- There is no doubt that if the criminal proceeding is a mere
device to get ,he party within the jurisdiction, service then made upon him
will be void. Commonweajth v. Daniel, 4 Clark 49 (Pa. 1847). But this is
no more than the ordinary rule that if the service is obtained by fraud or by
some trickery, it shall not be valid, no matter what form that fraud may take.
Hill v. Goodrich, 32 Conn. 588 (1858) ; Dunlap v. Cody, 31 Ia. 26o (1871).

CONTEMPT-CRIMINAL AND CIVIL-FORM OF PROCEEDINGs-An injunction
was issued against a labor union, restraining it from interference by intimidation with the complainant's business and workmen. Under the caption of
the main cause, proceedings were issued as a "motion for attachment for
contempt of court" against certain members of the union, only one of
whom had been a party defendant in the main cause. Held: This is a proceeding for punishment of a criminal contempt and should properly be brought
in the name of the United States or "It re" the defendant, This defect however is waived if the party goes to trial without objection [The motion was
ultimately dismissed, however, on account of the insufficiency of the moving
papers.I Phillips Co. v. Amalgamated Assn., 208 Fed. Rep. 335 (1913).
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The distinction between proceedings to punish civil contempt, which are
remedial in nature, to protect the rights of the parties in interest, and proceedings to punish criminal contempt, which are punitive in nature, to preserve
the polver and dignity of the courts, is well established, although it is often
difficult to place a given case within the proper class. Many contempts are
both criminal and civil. Bessette v. Conkey Co. 194 U. S. 329 (19o3) ; and
in such a case though the proceeding is treated throughout as criminal, it
is not improper for the court to make two awards, the one punitive, the other
compensatory. Kreplik v. Couch Patents Co., 19o Fed. Rep. 565 (1911),
The accused cannot be charged in proceedings for civil contempt unless he
was a party defendant in the main cause, on the theory that civil contempt
proceedings being compensatory and supplemental to the main cause, relief
cannot be given against one not a party to that action. Garrigan v. U. S., 163
Fed. Rep. 16 (igo8). But, aside from this one rule, the question of whether
a proceeding to punish a contempt is civil or criminal is one which can only
be determined by considering all the circumstances of the case, the caption of
the papers, the prayer of the petition, etc. Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range
Co., 221 U. S.418 (igir). Civil contempt proceedings should be brought by
the party in interest in his own name, under the same caption as that of the
main cause in which the order disobeyed was issued; criminal contempt proceedings should be brought by the party in interest as representative of the
-"
,'"or "In re
United States, and entitled "United States v.
Gompers v. Buck's Stove Co., supra. By this the defendant will know that
it is a charge against him and not a suit. But although this is the proper
way to bring such a proceeding, yet it is held in the principal case that it is
not the only or necessary way. If it be brought in the name of the plaintiff,
this is a mere defect in form which the accused waives if he goes to trial
without objection.
A criminal contempt proceeding arising out of an order in a purely civil
case, though in the name of the United States, is brought by the party in interest and need not be by the United States attorney. In re Star Spring Bed
Co., 2o3 Fed. Rep. 640 (1913). There appears to be no authority on the question of whether or not it is the duty of the United States attorney to bring
criminal contempt proceedings whenever it becomes necessary to vindicate
the authority of the court and the private parties are unwilling or unable
to do so.
CRIMINAL

LAW-MANSLACGHTER-PHYSICAL

CONDITION

OF DECEASED-

The defendant negligently drove his automobile into an embankment, and
the deceased, a passenger, was thrown out oin his head. As a result of the
injury, the decedent, who had an alcoholic brain which rendered him susceptible to delirium tremens, suffered an attack of that disease and died
thereof. Held: Although the fall would not have resulted fatally to a person in ordinary health, the defendant was guilty of manslaughter. State
v. Block, 89 At. Rep. 167 (Conn. 1913).
It seems, as is indicated in the opinion, that no case with identical facts
has previously been determined. However, it is well settled that a person
whose act is the mediate, though not the immediate cause, of another's death,
is liable for the homicide. Keely v. State, 53 Ind. 311 (1876) ; State v.
Foote, 58 S. C. 218 (igoo). Thus, it is no defence that if the injured person
had subsequently been properly cared for, death would not have occurred.
Bishop v. State, 123 Ala. 7 (1899).
As a general rule, evidence will not be admitted to show that death would
not have resulted from the injury inflicted by the defendant, had it not been
for the enfeebled physical condition of the deceased, whether or not the
former had knowledge thereof. Cunningham v. People, 195 Ill. 550 (1902);
State v. Costello, 62 Iowa 404 (1883) ; Commonwealth v. Fix, 7 Gray 585
(Mass. t856)) ; Griffin v. State, 5o S.W. Rep. (Tex. 1899). The defendant
will not be permitted to prove that the wounds given would not have been fatal
in more than one case in a hundred. State v. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283 (1907).
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Where a wound, not in itself mortal, accelerates the death of a person already
mortally injured, the person inflicting it is nevertheless guilty of homicide.
People v. Ah Fat, 48 Cal. 61 (1874). However, evidence of the deceased's
prior state of health is admissible to ascertain whether death ensued from
the harm done by the defendant. Phillips v. State, 68 Ala. 47o (1881).
DisoRiEmLY HOUSE-NATuRE OF THE Bunmu a-A hack driver habitually
permitted his hack to be used for lewd purposes and solicited lewd patrons
whom he took to secluded places. Held: A conviction for keeping a "house
of ill fame" was proper. State v. Render, 144 N. W. Rep. 298 (Iowa, 1913).
The keeping of a disorderly house was an indictable offense at common
law, Common. v. Kellar, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 537 (1886); Jennings v. Common.,
34 Mass. 8o (1835) ; but is today generally provided for by statute or municipal ordhiance. Although the statutes usually describe the offense as keeping a disorderly "house," the courts have not restricted this to the strict
meaning of the word "house," but have held that it applies to any place
where lewd and disorderly practices are permitted. So any building used
as a shelter for disorderly persons, State v. Powers, 36 Conn. 77 (1869);
a single room, People v. Buchanan, I Idaho, 681 (1878); a boat, State v.
Mullen, 35 Iowa, 199 (1872) ; a tent, Killman v. State, 2 Tex. App. 222 (1877) ;
a covered wagon, State v. Chauvret, III Iowa, 687 (19oo); have all been

held disorderly houses within the meaning of the statute. To authorize a
conviction for keeping a disorderly house it is not necessary to show it was
kept for gain, State v. Porter, 130 Iowa, 69o (igo6) ; nor that the proprietor
maintained it for the purposes of immoral practices, State v. Wilson, 124
Iowa, 264 (19o4); it is sufficient that he knows of the fact, connives at it,
or does not prevent it. De Forest v. U. S., ii App. D. C. 458 (1897).
EMINENT

DoMAIN-TAKINc,-The most suitable field of fire in times of

peace for practice and other purposes of an adjacent coast defense battery
was over the land in question. The guns, however, had been so fired on but
two occasions, both shortly after installation, and not once within the last
eight years. Since there is nothing to show any intention on the part of
the government to repeat such firing, it was ruled such land cannot be
said to have been appropriated so as to raise an implied agreement on the
part of the government for compensation because of the impairment of the
value of the same, due to the apprehension of a repetition of the firing over
and across them. Peabody v. United States, 34 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 159 (913).

This decision recognizes the rule that there need not be a seizure, a
direct appropriation and dispossession of the owners; but the facts were
not sufficient to make it a "taking" within the principle of Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Canal Co., 13 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1871). It was there laid down
that where land is actually invaded by superinduced additions of water, earth,
or other materials, so as effectually to impair its usefulness, it is taken. This
rule represents the prevailing opinion. Hooker v. New Haven & N. Co.,
14 Conn. 146 (1841); Heiss v. Milwaukee & L. W. R., 69 Wis. 555 (1887);
Miles v. Worcester, 154 Mass. 5II (18gi). In McIntyre v. U. S., 25 Ct. Cl.
200 (i8go), the court of claims recognizes the rule in Pumpelly's Case, but
found it inapplicable because the injury was temporary, and not the probable or necessary consequence of the work. Accord, Payne v. Kansas City
R. Co., 112 Mo. 6 (1892);. High Bridge Lumber Co. v. U. S., 69 Fed. 324
(1895); De Baker v. So. Cal. R. Co., lo6 Cal. 257 (1895).
In some decisions a taking has been strictly limited to the acquisition
of property for public use, and any damage, no matter how appreciable and
permanent, inflicted upon other property, has been considered to be beyond
the purview of the constitutional declaration. Livermore v. Jamaica 23
Vt. 361 (1851); see also Penny v. S. E. R. Co., 7 El. & B. 66o (Eng. 1857).

This strict construction is not, however, now generally sanctioned, and, while
the decisions are by no means harmonious, the general rule deducible from
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them seems to be that any destruction, restriction, or interruption of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of property in a lawful manner
may constitute a taking. Foster v. Scott, 136 N. Y. 577 (1893); Brinton
v. Comm., 178 Mass. igg (igoi); U. S. v. Lynch, z88 U. S. 445 (9o2).
To constitute an appropriation within the intent of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the taking must be of a kind from which
some benefit is to be anticipated. McIntyre v. U. S., supra.
EVIDENcE-AcTION FOR WRONGFUL DEATHM-In an action for wrongful

death, it is not error to admit into evidence the number and ages of the children of the deceased, in order to show an incentive to thrift and an increased
earning capacity, provided the court instructed the jury that there could be
no greater damages due to the greater needs of a.large family. Nicoll v.
Sweet, 144 N. W. Rep. 615 (Ia. 1913).

There are two important elements in assessing damages in an action for
wrongful death. One is the probable earning capacity of the deceased and
the other the claimant's benefit from that earning capacity. Hence a widow
can not recover probable earnings for a period longer than her own expectancy of life nor than that of her husband; that is, she can recover his
earnings during their joint expectancy only. Redfield v. Oakland Ry. Co.,
42 Pac. Rep. zo63 (Cal. 1896). The measure of damages is not the pecuniary
value of the decedent's life, but the value of that life to the claimant. Houston Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 27 Tex. Civ. App. 42o (Igoi). Therefore the personal expenses of the victim should be deducted from his gross earning
capacity. Savannah Ry. Co. v. Flannagan, 82 Ga. 579 (s88q). The jury
does not concern itself with what the claimant has customarily received from
the decedent, but what he had a right to receive. In an action by a widow,
it was held immaterial that the husband had not in fact contributed to the
support of the family for a great time, so long as the widow had not, by her
own wrong, forfeited her right to that support. B. & 0. R. R. v. State, use
of Chambers, 8i Md. 371 (1895). Nor can one recover on the ground of
gratuities customarily received from the deceased. A mother must show beside
contributions from decedent her dependence upon those contributions. Middle
Georgia R. R. v. Barnett, IO4 Ga. 582 (r898). The general rule of damages for wrongful death is the one stated above, that one can recover the
value to himself of the life of the decedent. Rhoads v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co.,
227 Ill. 328 (1907); Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Drumm, 32 Ind. App.

547 (igo3). It has been held that the administrator may recover the present
value of the probable accumulation of the deceased if he had lived to his
expectancy, Carlson v. Oregon Short Line, 2r Ore. 450 (z892); Jacksonville

Elec. Co. v. Bowden, 45 So. Rep. 755 (Fla. igo8).
EViENCE-PRESUMPTION-MAIL-The

plaintiff mailed a letter inclosing

a draft and bill of lading to the defendant bank. There was evidence that
the bank did not receive the letter nor collect the draft, but the bill of lading
to which the draft was attached was used by the consignee. Held: Proof that
the letter was mailed raised a presumption of its receipt in due course. Model
Mill Co. v. Webb, 8o S. E. Rep. 232 (N. C.. 1913).
A letter sent by the post is prima facie proof, until the contrary be established, that the party to whom it is addressed received it in due course.
Jensen v. McCorkell, T54 Pa. 323 (893); Goodwin v. Assurance Co., 97 Ia.
226 (1896); Ashley Wire Co. v.. Ill. Steel Co., x64 Ill. 149 (i896). Before
the presumption arises it must appear that the letter was properly stamped,

directed to a party at his post-office address and deposited in the regular

receptacle for mail. Huntley v. Whittier, 105 Mass. 391 (i87o) ; Kimberly v.

Arms. 129 U. S. 512 (r889). But the presumption is rebutted by positive
and direct evidence to the contrary. McDermott v. Jackson, 97 Wis. 64
(897) : Grade v. Mariposa County, 132 Cal. 75 (xgoi). The principle has
been applied to an express carrier's delivery of packages. American Ex-
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press Co. v. Haggard, 37 Ill. 465 (1865) ; Beiderbecka v. Transportation Co.,
39 Ia. 5oo (1874). And to a telegraph company's transmission of telegrams.
Oregon Steamship Co. v. Otis, ioo N. Y. 446 (1885) ; Eppinger v. Scott, 112
Cal. 369 (1896). The same applicati6n of the principle would admit a private
person's usual course of business to evidence any act of delivery or transmission. Beakes v. Da Crucha, 126 N. Y. 293 (i8g); McKay v. Meyers,
168 Mass. 312 (I897).
The general rule is that the arrival by mail of a reply purporting to be
from the addressee of a prior letter duly addressed and mailed is pritna
fade sufficient evidence of the genuineness of the reply letter. Campbell v.
Woodstock Iron Co., 83 Ala. 351 (1887); Norwegian Plow Co. v. Munger,
52 Kan. 371 (1893).
The courts will not presume that a stranger surreptitiously or otherwise got possession of the original letter and answered it.
Chicago R. R. Co. v. Roberts, IO Colo. App. 87 (1897); Lancaster v. Ames,
1O3 Me. 87 (1907).
But will presume that such answer is the letter of the
one whose name is signed to it. Scofield v. Parlin Co., 61 Fed. Rep. 8o4 (1894) ;
Ragan v. Smith, 1O3 Ga. 556 (1897). And will admit such reply letter in
evidence without proof that it is in the handwriting of the party purporting to have sent it. Nat. Acc. Soc. v. Spiro, 78 Fed. Rep. 774 (1897) ; Grayville Waterworks v. Burdick, iog Ill. App. 520 (1903).
EVIDENCE-SELF INcRIMINATIoN-In a civil action for damages for criminal conspiracy to libel, the defendant refused to answer several questions on
the ground that the answers would tend to incriminate him. Held: A witness in a civil action is privileged from answering such questions under the
constitutional provision that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself." Karel v. Conlan, 144 N. W. Rep. 266
(Wis. 1913).
The law is well settled that a witness cannot invoke the privilege for
the purpose of avoiding a purely civil liability. Bull v. Loveland, io Pick.
9 (Mass. 183o); Alexander v. Knox, 7 Ala. 503 (1845). Such as acknowledging a debt, or bringing some purely pecuniary disadvantage on himself.
B. & M. R. R. Co. v. State, 75 N. H. 513 (igog). But the privilege extends
to a witness in a civil proceeding, as well as a criminal, where the answer
would subject the witness to a criminal prosecution. Gates v. Hardacre, 3
Taunton, 424 (Eng. 1811) ; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892) ;
People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N. Y. 253 (i9o3) ; Wilkins v. Malone,
14 Ind. 153 (186o).
There is no such privilege, however, where there has been a promise
of exemption from prosecution coming from the proper authorities. In re
Taylor, 8 Misc. Rep. 159 (N. Y. 1894); Muller v. State, 79 Tenn. 18 (1883).
Or where a statute of immunity has removed the danger of prosecution.
People v. Cahill, r26 App. Div. 391 (N. Y. 19o8); U. S. v. McCarthy, 18
Fed. Rep. 87 (1883). These principles are clear since the object of the
constitutional provision was to protect the witness and the privilege ceases
with the necessity for protection.
The liability of prosecution must appear reasonable to the court or the
witness will be compelled to answer. Real v. People, 42 N. Y. 270 (1870);
Temple v. Com., 75 Va. 892 (1881); State v. Farmer, 46 N. H. 2oo (z865).
JUDGMENT-PRESUMPTION OF PAYMENT-Suit was brought upon a judgment which had been recovered more than twenty years before. Held: The
fact that during the time the creditor was a*non-resident and had made diligent inquiry as to the financial status of the debtor without finding any
property was enough to rebut the presumption of payment after twenty years.
Judson v. Phelps, 89 Atl. Rep. I6 (Conn. 1913).
At the common law all judgments were, as a matter of public policy,
presumed to be paid at the end of twenty years. This rule has been generally adopted in States where there is no statutory provision. Biddle v.
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Girard National Bank, log Pa. 349 (1885) ; Janvier v. Culbreth, 5 Penne. 5o5
(Del. 19o5); though some States have changed the period of time necessary to give rise to the presumption: fourteen years, Wittsbruck v. Temple,
58 Neb. 16 (i899); ten years. Moore v. Williams, 129 Ala. 329 (I9oi). This
presumption of payment is in its nature essentially different from the bar
imposed upon contract debts by the statute of limitations. The statute prohibits action upon the debt; the presumption prima facie obliterates the debt.
Bank v. Thompson, 44 Pa. Super. Ct. 200 (191o). The creditor is bound conclusively by the statute, but only prima facie by the presumption. He may
rebut the presumption by any evidence tending to show that the judgment has
not been satisfied. Day v. Crosby, 173 Mass. 433 (1899). The evidence must
be satisfactory and convincing, Trust Co. v. Chapman, 226 Pa. 312 (91o),
and must be something more than the bare statement of the creditor that
the debt was not paid. Hummel v. Lilly, 16 Pa. Super. Ct. 327 (19O).
Whether the facts alleged are strong enough to rebut the presumption is a
question of law for the court; whether they are true, a question for the jury.
Gregory v. Commonwealth, 121 Pa. 611 (i888).
LIBEL-PRIVILEGE-MALICE-In an action for libel against the author and

printer of a pamphlet the jury found that the author of the libel, who had set
up privilege as a defence, was actuated by malice, but acquitted the printers
of the charge of malice. Held: The publication was joint and since the
defence of privilege failed in the case of the author, his liability attached to
the printers in spite of the fact of the finding of the jury that there was
no malice on their part. Smith v. Streatfield, iog L. T. Rep. 173 (Eng. 1913).
The decision turns on the question of whether the defence of privilege in
an action of libel attaches to the publication or to the person or persons making the publication. If it attaches to the publication, then malice on the
part of any one of the publishers will overthrow the privilege and this defence will fail as to all. But if it attaches to the individual publishers, malice
proved against one will not destroy the defence of privilege set up by the
others. The court in the principal case assumes the most difficult points,
viz., that the author and printer are joint tort-feasors and that the privilege
attaches to the publication, not to the individual, and no authorities are
cited to support either proposition.
It is clear that when malice is sought to be proved, not as the basis of
the plaintiff's right to recover, but in order to secure punitive damages, the
malice of one party is no ground for aggravation of damage against another
party who was free from malice. Clark v. Newsam, I Ex. 131, 139 (Eng.
1847); Robertson v. Wylde, 2 Moo. & Rob. ioi (Eng. 1838). It is submitted
that the rule should be the same when, as in an action of libel when the
defense is privilege, proof of malice is an essential prerequisite to the plaintiff's right to recover, and that in such a case malice by one defendant should
not be imputed to another. The case of Hennessy v. Wright, 24 Q. B. D. 445
(Eng. I888), was apparently overlooked by the court in the principal case.
This was an action of libel, brought against a newspaper, which defended
on the ground of fair comment, i. e., privilege. An effort was made to introduce evidence of malice on the part of the correspondent who wrote the defamatory article, although this correspondent was not a party defendant to
the action. Held: (Lord Esher, M. R.) "If the privilege is abused for the
purpose of personal vengeance,

. . . although the occasion may have been

privileged, the defendant is not privileged, because he is not using his privilege but gratifying his malice. But to show that the persons who informed
the defendant were malicious does not carry the case any further. What
must be shown is, that the defendant was malicious, and to show that his
informants were malicious is not evidence that he was malicious." The facts
of the principal case and this case are identical, save only that in th6 latter
the action was brought against the printer alone. It is submitted, however,
that the words used by Lord Esher show clearly that he thought privilege
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attached to the individual publishers of a libel and that malice must be proved
against each one in order to destroy privilege as to him. See Carmichael v.
Ry. Co., 13 Irish L. R. 313, 326 (1849).
LIMITATION OF ACTIONs-APPLIcATION OF PRocEEDs OF SALE OF CoLLATERALS

debtor, to secure his note, pledged stock as collateral
security with the payee bank and constituted its cashier his agent to sell and
apply the proceeds in case of default. Held: A sale and application of the
proceeds of the collaterals, after the statute of limitations had run against the
note, acted as a part payment sufficient to revive the debt. First National Bank
of Oxford v. King, 8o S. E. Rep. 251 (N. C. 1913).
The decision is in accord with the rule, followed in some jurisdictions,
that where collaterals are sold within a reasonable time and their proceeds
applied by the creditor in part payment of the principal debt, the statute of
limitations will be interrupted. Taylor v. Foster, 132 Mass. 30 (1882);
Haven v. Hathaway, 20 Me. 345 (1841); Sornberger v. Lee, 14 Neb. 193
(1883); N. Y. Insurance Co. v. Tooker, 4 N. J. L. J. 334 (1891). Where the
debtor himself sells the collaterals and passes their proceeds to the creditor,
there is sufficient acknowledgment of the debt and a new promise will be implied. Whipple v. Blackington, 97 Mass. 476 (1867). The same is of course
true when a third person is authorized to act as the debtor's agent. Thompson v. Hurley, I Ir. Rep. 588 (19o5). The difficulty arises where the creditor
is acting as agent. In Wood's "Limitation of Actions" ioi, it is contended,
citing Brown v. Latham, 58 N. H. 30 (1876), that the doctrine of the principal
case is fallacious, for the reason that the creditor cannot be made the agent
of the debtor to such extent as to make an act done by him operate as- a new
AS PART PAYMENT-A

promise.

As is indicated in the dissenting opinion of the principal case, there must
be a voluntary affirmative act by the debtor, contemporaneous with payment,
before the implication of a new promise will arise. U. S. v. Wilder, 13 Wall.
254 (U. S. 1871). The principle adopted by the majority opinion is based
upon a dictum in Porter v. Flood, 5 Pick. 476 (Mass. 1827), and has been

repudiated in many States for the above reasons. Lyon v. State Bank, 12
Ala. 5o8 (1847) ; Ferris v. Curtis, 53 Colo. 340 (1912) ; Wolford v. Cook, 71
Minn. 77 (i906); Brooklyn Bank v. Barnaby, 197 N. Y. 210 (igio); Wanamaker v. Plank, 117 Ill. App. 327 (io4); Good v. Ehrlich, 67 Kan. 94 (igo3).
NEGLIGENE-BREACH OF STATUTORY

DUTY-When a statute is in force,

establishing a statutory duty, the question arises whether the duty was imposed merely for the abstract public benefit, or for the benefit of the individuals affected as well. The statute may be remedial as well as penal,
giving a right of action to individuals over and above the penalty inflicted
by the State. The presence of a penal clause in such a statute does not
necessarily preclude right of action by individuals for injury caused through
breach of the statute. Strait v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 2o9 Fed. Rep. 157
(914).
Statutes may be passed creating duties and the breach of that statute
constitutes negligence. McRickard v. Flint, 114 N. Y. 222 (1889); Atlanta &
W. P. R. R. v. Wyly, 65 Ga. 120 (i88o). But there is no negligence where
no duty and hence only those toward whom the duty was owed can recover;
that is, those for whose protection the statute was enacted. O'Donnell v.
Providence & W. R. R., 6 R. I. 211 (1859); Cleveland, A. & C. R. R. v.
On the other hand it has been held that
Workman, 66 Ohio, 5o9 (1902).
anyone suffering from any breach of duty may recover. Atchison, T. & S,
F. R. R. v. Reesman, 6o Fed. Rep. 370 (1894); Anderson v. Settergen, x1i
N. W. Rep. 279 (Minn. i9o7). In a statute creatifig a new duty, there need
be no specific remedy mentioned, or that the statute is for the benefit of a
particular class of persons. Wolf v. Smith, 42 So. Rep. 824 (Ala. 1906);
Stearns v. Atlantic & St. L. Ry. Co., 46 Me. 95 (1858). Where, however, a
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penalty is actually imposed by statute, liability has in many States been
limited to the statutory penalty. Mack v. Wright, i8o Pa. 472 (1897) ; Grant
This is only true, however,
v. Slater Mill & Power Co., 14 R. I. 38o (884).
when a new duty has been created by the statute, and not when the statute
gives a new penalty for breach of a pre-existing duty. Lang v. Scott, I
Blackf. 405 (Ind. 1825). In accord with the principal case are Parker v.
Barnard, 135 Mass. II6 (1883); N. Y. R. R. v. Lambright, 5 Ohio C. C. 433
(189r).
NEGLIGENcE-FELLow SERVANT DocTRINE-The deceased was employed as
a stenographer on the fourth floor of the building of a publishing company.
On her way to work she was killed by the negligence of the elevator operator.
Held: The deceased was not a fellow servant with-the operator and the company is liable. Putnam v. Pacific Monthly Co., 136 Pac. Rep. 835 (Ore. 1913).
This decision shows the increasing tendency of the courts to depart from
the harsh fellow servant rule. Under the common employment rule in vogue
in the eastern jurisdictions the employer in the principal case would not
be liable. This rule is "where each servant is occupied in service of a kind
that all the others, in the exercise of ordinary sagacity, ought to be able to
see, when accepting their employment that another's negligence would probably expose them to the risk of injury, they are fellow servants." i Shearman & Redfield, Negligence 69i (6th Ed.); Baird v. Pettit, 7o Pa. 477 (1872) ;
N. & W. R. R. Co. v. Mickol's Adm'r, 9I Va. 193 (I895); Fouquet v. N. Y. C.
& H. R. R., io8 N. Y. S. 525 (i9o8).
The test in the West and South may be termed the "association" rule.
"Fellow servants are not in the same common employment unless they are
so engaged that their duties bring them into association with each other tb
such an extent that they can exercise some influence on each other in favor
of care and caution for their mutual safety." I Shearman & Redfield, Negligence 694 (6th Ed.); C. & N. R. R. Co. v. Moranda, 93 Ill. 3o2 (I879) ; Dixon
v. C. & A. R. R. Co., IO9 Mo. 413 (I89I); A. T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v. McKee,
37 Kan. 592 (1887); Kentucky C. R. R. Co. v. Ackley, 87 Ky. 278 (1888).
The principal case was decided under this latter test with two judges dissenting on the ground that the deceased was thrown so constantly with the
operator that all the requirements of the rule were fulfilled, and it is submitted that this is the correct deduction from the facts. However, the decision is consistent with the public sentiment of the age, which seems to be
that the fellow servant rule has served its term of usefulness.
NEGLIGENCE-LANDLORD'S LIABJUTY-The defendant erected a building
which he demised to a tenant for a garage. The plaintiff placed his automobile in the garage to be cared for under a contract with the tenant. Due
to a patent defect in the construction of the roof, it fell during a heavy rain
injuring the plaintiff's automobile. Held: The plaintiff had no cause of action. Meade v. Montrose, i6o S. W. Rep. ii (Mo. 1913).
A lessor is ordinarily under no duty to see that the premises are, at the
time of the demise, fit for the use to which the lessee may propose to put
them. McKenzie v. Cheetham, 83 Me. 543 (i89i) ; Dyer v. Robinson, iIO Fed.
Rep. 99 ('899); Phelan v. Fitzpatrick, I88 Mass. 237 (I9O5). And, therefore, the lessee cannot assert a claim for damages against the lessor on
account of the condition of the premises at the time of the demise. McKeon
v. Cutter, 156 Mass. 291 (1892); Wilcox v. Hate, 65 Vt. 478 (i893). The
rule, however, is subject to the exception that, if there is some hidden defect known to the lessor, at the time of making the lease, he is bound to in; Whiteley
form the lessee. Whitehead v. Comstock Co., 25 R. 1. 423 (o3)
v. McLaughlin, 183 Mo. i6o (19o4); Rhodes v. Seidel, 139 Mich. 6o8 (I9O5).
And his liability extends not only to dangerous conditions which he actually
knows, but also to those the existence of which he has reasonable ground
to suspect. Albert v. State, 66 Md. 325 (i886) ; Lindsey v. Leighton, i5o
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Mass. 285 (I889). But if the defects are such as would be apparent to the
lessee on a reasonably careful inspection, there is no obligation upon the lessor to notify him of their existence, Booth v. Merriam, 155 Mass. 521 (1892) ;
Shackford v. Coffin, 95 Me. 69 (igoi) ; Borggard v. Gale, 205 Ill. 510 (1903).
The same rules apply to persons other than the tenant rightfully on the
premises by the tenants' request or permission. Cohe v. Gutkese, 80 Ky. 598
(1883) ; Whitmore v. Orono Paper Co., gr Me. 297 (1898) ; Shute v. Bills, 19i
Mass, 433 (i906). But a guest or servant of a tenant can have no greater
claim against the landlord than the tenant himself would have under like
circumstances. Deller v. Hofferberth, 127 Ind. 414 (I89O); Hilsenbeck v.
Guhring, 131 N. Y. 674 (1892).

The lessor of premises used for a public or quasi public purpose, such
as a wharf or pier, or a public hall, has been held liable to persons rightfully
there for defects existing at the time of the demise. Albert v. State, 66 Md.
325 (i886) ; Eckman v. Atlantic Lodge, 68 N. J. L. io (19o2).

The courts

hold there is a duty upon the lessor of such premises, which does not exist
in the case of other premises, to see that they are, when demised, safe for
use by the public. Fox v. Buffalo Park, 47 N. Y. Supp. 788 (I897); Smith
v. State, 92 Md. 518 (I9o1). The view, however, that a distinction exists between a building devoted to public purposes and one devoted to private purposes has been expressly repudiated. Wilcox v. Hines, ioo Tenn. 538
(i898).
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF INNKEEPER FOR ASSAULT BY SERVANT-A guest
in a restaurant was assaulted by a waiter. The proprietor knew that this
waiter had a violent temper and that he had assaulted other guests on previous occasions. Held: The proprietor is liable for injuries inflicted by his
servant on the guest. Duckworth v. Appostalis, 2o8 Fed. Rep. 936 (1913).
The basis of the landlord's liability in this case is his negligence in harboring persons dangerous to the peace and comfort of those for whose com-

fort he is bound to provide. Rahmel v. Lehndorff, I

Cal. 681 (1904).

And

he is liable for injuries to guests caused by the acts of other disorderly guests
as well as for those of his employees. Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579
(1889). This liability is analogous to that of the master for the acts of a
servant known by him to be incompetent where a fellow servant is injured.
Siveat v. B. & A. R. R. Co., 156 Mass. 284 (1892); Mann v. D. & H. Canal
Co., 9iN. Y. 495 (1883).
A much more doubtful point presents itself when the innkeeper did not
know of the dangerous character of his employee. The weight of authority
holds-that the innkeeper's obligation is limited to the exercise of reasonable
care for the safety and comfort of his guests, and that he is not liable for
assaults committed by an employee on the ground that this is entirely outside
the scope of the latter's authority. Weeks v. McNulty, ioi Tenn. 499 (I898).
However, some courts have held the innkeeper liable on the implied contract
that his guests shall be free from harm when enjoying his hospitality. Clancy
v. Barker, I31 Fed. Rep. i6I (904); Romml v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. 579
(I889). This liability is considered by the latter decisions coincident with
that of the common carrier. Dwinelle v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 12o N.
Y. 122 (i8go); P. Ft. W. & C. R. R. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 515 (1866); Bryant
v. Rich, io6 Mass. 188 (1890).
NEW TRIAL-JOINT TORT FEASOs-Suit was brought against three joint
tort feasors. The evidence established the liability of two but not of the
third. The jury returned a general verdict against all three. Held: The
court on motion for a new trial, might let the judgment stand as against
the first two and order a new trial as to the third. Pence v. Bryant, 8o S. E.
Rep. 137 (W. Va. 1913).

This case shows the general law today. The early law did not allow a
new trial to be granted as to one tort feasor and the judgment to stand as
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to the others because the award of the venire de novo extinguished the whole
prior venire and thus when a new trial was awarded to one there was nothihg
to bind the others. A few States still follow this rule, Findlay v. Ry., 5 Ga.
App. 722 (igog). However the majority of the States regard this objection
as technical and allow a new trial to be granted as to one and the judgmeht
to stand as to the others. Ry. v. Foulks, 191 Ill. 57 (iol) ; Gross v. Scheel,
67 Neb. 223 (1903). The cases base their decision on the ground that the liability in tort is joint and several and therefore the judgment is severable.
Albright v. McTighe, 49 Fed. Rep. 817 (1892); Kansas City v. File, 6o Kan.
157 (1899); Sparrow v. Bromage, 83 Conn.

27

(1910).

When it is a ques-

tion of reversing the judgment as to one and letting it stand as to the others,
the cases are more in conflict. The common law rule did not allow reversal
as to one and affirmance as to the others because the judgment was looked
on as an entirety. Massey v. Oates, 143 Ala. 248 (19O4) ; Henning v. Sampsell, 236 Ill. 375 (i9o8). But most States have changed front this rule, some
by statute. Ry. v. Treadway, 142 Ind. 475 (1895); Westervelt v. St. Louis
Transit Co., 222 Mo. 325 (I99) : others by decision, Ry. v. Tucker, 105 Ky.
492 (I895); Sutherland v. Ingalls, 63 Mich. (1886). Thus the general rule
is to look into the nature of the case and to allow the judgment to be severed when the interests of the parties may rightfully be severed. Stotler v,
Chicago Co., 200 Mo. 107 (1906).
PARTNERSHIP-INSOLVENcY-RIGiTS oF FmM AND INDIVIDUAL CREDITORSA partnership and the individual partners were insolvent and in bankruptcy,
and there were no partnership assets avail-able for distribution among the
partnership creditors. Held: That such creditors had the right to share
pari passu with the separate creditors of one partner in the net proceeds of
his separate property. In re Gray, 208 Fed. Rep. 959 (1913).
The rule in this case was early adopted in England, Ex parte Hayden, I
Bro. Ch. 454 (1785), and has been generally followed there for more than
a century. In re Budgett, 2 Ch. 557 (I894). The same result was attaitted
in the cases in the United States at common law and undei" the Bankruptcy
Acts of 1841 and 1867, In re Jewett, Fed. Cas. No. 7,304 (I868); In re
Knight, Fed. Cas. No. 788o (87). The decisions under the Act of 1898 are
in conflict, that of the principal case being based upon Conrader v. Cohen, 121
Fed. Rep. 8oi (19o3). An exhaustive opinion by Mr. Justice Lowell in the
case of In re Wilcox, 94 Fed. Rep. 84 (1899), reviews all of the leading English and American cases and denies the conclusion which they have reached.
In re Janes, 133 Fed. Rep. 912 (1904) in accord.
The Act of 1898 §5, cl. f, under which these latter cases are decided, provides that the net proceeds of the individual estate Of each partner shall be
appropriated to the payment of his individual debts and the net proceeds of
the partnership property to the payment of the partnership debts. Any
surplus of property of any partner remaining after his individual debts
are paid, is to be applied to the payment of partnership debts. But nothing
further is said concerning the rights of firm creditors against the individual
property of the partners. It is submitted that the decision of the principal
case, and those in accord with it, are clearly in violation of these provisions.
It has been said that the stattite merely expresses the general rule governing
the equitable distribution of such funds, and that this should only apply where
both partnership and individual estates are before the court for distribution.
It re Conrader, 118 Fed. Rep. 6'6 (19o2). As nothing to this effect is stipulated, however, it appears to be an attempt to make a distinction in order to
avoid the application of the rule.
PARTNERSHIP-ToRT LIABILITY-The owner of property employed a partnership to dig a well. The well-digging machine was operated by one partnet alone, and owing to his negligence an adjoining barn caught fire front
the sparks emitted from the machine, which was proved to have been negligently operated by the one partner. Held: An action is not maintainable
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against the partnership, because a partnership is not liable for the torts of
one of the partners. Battle v. Pennington, 8o S. E. Rep. 247 (Ga. 1913).
At common law and in almost all States in this country today a partnership is held liable for any torts committed by a partner within the scope of
the partnership business. Miller v. Phenix Ins. Co., iog Ill. App. 624 (1903) ;
Guarantee Trust Co. v. Drew Co., 107 La. 251 (1902) ; Grissom v. Hofius, 39
Wash. 5i (I9O5); Nisbet v. Patton, 4 Rawle i2o (Pa. 1833); Lothrop v.
Adams, 133 Mass. 471 (1882). But the principal case is decided under a
statute in Georgia which provides: "Partners are not responsible for torts
committed by a copartner. For the negligence or torts of their agents or
servants they are responsible under the like rules with individuals." Ga.
Code 1910 §3187. It might be thought that the intention of the legislature
in passing this statute was to relieve a partner only from liability for such
direct acts of his co-partner as trespass, libel, etc., and was not intended to
apply to an action for negligence. This distinction, however, the court refused to draw in Corbett v. Connor, ii Ga. App. 385 (1912). It might also
well be argued that, since each partner is in law the agent of the others,
one partner could make the partnership liable for his torts as its agent if
not as partner. But this proposition was also denied in Ozborn v. Woolworth, io6 Ga. 459 (I899), the court holding that the provision that partners
should be liable for the torts of their agents was manifestly not intended
to apply to those agents who were members of the partnership. The decision in the principal case, therefore, though hardly supportable on principle,
and, it is submitted, not a necessary decision under this anomalous act, is well
sanctioned by the weight of authority in that State. Cf. the decision in
Hobbs v. Packing Co., 98 Ga. 576, 581 (1896) which, apparently oblivious
to the statute, holds that a partner may render his firm liable for his torts.
PHYSICIANS AND 'SURGEONs-LIABILITY OF OPERATING SURGEON FOR NEG-

a surgeon had carefully performed
an operation on a patient, the nurses and internes of the hospital in sewing
up and dressing the wound, negligently left in the body several feet of gauze
and a drain of rubberized silk. Held: The surgeon cannot be held for this
negligence. Hunner v. Stevenson, 89 Atl. Rep. 418 (Md. 1913).
The principle that a man exercising a trade is liable to a person injured
by his negligence in that trade is fundamental in the common law. Year
Book, 46 Ed. III, I9 pl. I9 (1491); Fitz-Herbert, Nat. Brev. 94 D. There is
thus no doubt that the surgeon in the principal case would have been liable
had he himself done the act of sewing up, or had it been his duty to inspect
it. Akridge v. Noble, 114 Ga. 949 (19oi) ; Reynolds v. Smith, 148 Iowa 264.
(i91o). But in determining the extent of a surgeon's liability for materials
left in the body after an operation, the extent of the duty of the surgeon must
be considered. Harris v. Fall, 177 Fed. Rep. 79 (igio). The recognized
custom in hospitals is that a surgeon is engaged to perform the actual operation, and that nurses and internes are supplied to attend to the ordinary work
of dressing and treating the wound after the operation. Perionowsky v.
Freeman, 4 Foster & F., 977, 98i (Eng. 1866). The duty of a surgeon then
extends only to the actual operation performed, 'and not to the treatment
subsequently given. The distinction drawn in the principal case between articles left in the wound at the time of the operation and while the surgeon
is in charge, and those left in during subsequent treatment, is sound in prinsupra; Harris v.
ciple and well supported by authority. Reynolds v. Smith,
Fall, . upra; Baker v. Wentworth, 155 Mass. 338 (1892 ) ; Wharton v. Warner,
LIGENcE OF HOSPITAL AUTHORITIEs-After

135 Pac. Rep. 235 (Wash. 1913).
PROCEDURE-MoTION IN ARREST OF JUDGENT-After verdict, the defendant undertook by motion in arrest of judgment to raise the same legal questions respecting the sufficiency of the declaration as were presented on a demurrer. Held: The rule is, that after judgment on demurrer by solemn de-

RECENT CASES
termination, there can be no motion in arrest of judgment for any exceptions
that might have been taken on arguing the demurrer. White v. Central Vermont Ry. Co., 89 At. Rep. 618 (Vt. 1914).
The majority of jurisdictions uphold this view and will not entertain
such a motion after the overruling of a demurrer to the declaration either
for any exceptions which might have been considered on the demurrer.
Shreffler v. Nadelhoffer, 133 Ill. 536 (i8o) ; Mayer v. Lawrence, 58 Ill. App.
194 (1895); Davis v. Carrol, 71 Md. 568 (1889); Edwards v. Blunt, i Str.
425 (Eng. 1883). But there are cases contra, Newman v. Perrill, 73 Ind. 153
(i88o); Hydes Ferry Turnpike Co., io8 Tenn. 428 (Igo2); McCall v. Sullivan, i Tex. App. Civ. Case I (1892) ; or for any exceptions that were considered on the demurrer. Price v. Art Printing Co., 112 Ill. App. I (i9o4) ;
Chicago, etc. R. Co. v. Clauson, 173 Ill. ioo (I898) ; Davis v. Carroll, supra;
Freeman v. Camden, 7 Mo. 298 (1842); Ro;e v. Burlington, i Aik. 43
(Vt. 1825); but see Decatur v. Simpson, 115 Iowa 348 (19o2); Stewart v.
Terre Haute etc. R. Co., io3 Ind. 44 (I885).
In analogy to the leading case the same difference of views is borne
out by the different jurisdictions where a subsequent demurrer is taken so as
to take effect upon matter previously demurred to, which demurrer was
overruled. In Cummins v. Gray, 4 S. & P. 397 (Ala. 1833) ; Johnson v. Pensacola Co., 16 Fla. 623 (1878) ; Pittsburgh Co. v. Hixon, 79 Ind. 1 (i881),
and Perrin v. Thurman, 4 T. B. Monroe 176 (Ky. 1843), it was ruled that the
second demurrer does open the whole record even beyond where the former
demurrer was overruled. People v. Opera House Co., 249 Ill. io6 (i9i) ; Fish
v. Tarwell, i6o Ill. 236 (1896); Ricknor v. Clabber, 76 S. W. R. 271 (Ind.
Ter. I9O3) contra.
The overruling of a demurrer to a declaration does not preclude the defendant from objecting at the trial that the declaration shows no cause of
action. Perry v. Baker, 6i Neb. 841 (igoi); Tiernan v. Miller, 96 N. W. R.
661 (Neb. I9O3).
SALES-CHATTEL MORTGAGES-A

chattel mortgage was issued upon cer-

tain property upon condition that the mortgagor should remain in possession
until there was default in payment. Before the condition was broken, the
mortgagor sold the property as his own to an innocent purchaser. Held: The
mortgagee could recover the property from the purchaser. Shorter v. Dale,
89 At. Rep. 329 (Md. 1913).
In ordinary chattel mortgages, a stipulation that the mortgagor is to
have possession until breach of condition bars any action by the mortgagee
before such breach. Calkins v. Clement, 54 Vt. 635 (i88I); Madison Bank
v. Farmer, 5 Dak. 282 (1888). The authorities are not in accord as to the
nature of the right in the mortgagor in possession. Some States consider
that it is a personal right and allow recovery by the mortgagee if the goods
are found in the possession of one other than the mortgagor. Levi v. Legg,
23 S. C. 282 (i885).
The better rule, however, is that the mortgagor has a
substantial and valuable interest in the property and that this interest is assignable, Heflin and Phillips v. Slay, 78 Ala. i8o (1884); and subject to
levy, Simmons v. Jenkins, 76 Ill. 479 (I875). This interest may be sold only
subject to the mortgage; if it is sold in antagonism to the mortgage, it is
tortious. Lafayette Bank v. Metcalf, 4o Mo. App. 494 (I89O).
Thus the
mortgagor may not assume to dispose of the property as his own; a sale of
the entire property is in exclusion of the mortgagee's rights and is a conversion on the part of the mortgagor. Dean v. Cushman, 95 Me. 454 (i9OI).
The more general rule holds that the purchaser though innocent is also
guilty of conversion and that the mortgagee may recover from him without
making any demand. Lafayette Bank v. Metcalf, 40 Mo. App. 494 (890);
Carey v. Bright, 58 Pa. 70 (x868). But some States hold that the innocent
purchaser is entitled to a demand before he is guilty of conversion. Dean
v. Cushman, 95 Me. 454 (igoi); Gillett v. Roberts, 57 N. Y. 28 (1874). Thi,
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act of conversion as it is contrary to the agreement for the mortgagor to remain in possession, gives the mortgagee the immediate right to possession,
though the condition is technically not broken. Lafayette Bank v. Metcalf,
In the principal case, it is not clear whether the
40 Mo. App. 494 (189o).
court regards the interest of the mortgagor as a personal or an assignable
right; under the circumstances of the case, the decision is correct, no matter which way the mortgagor's interest is regarded.
SALES-FRAUDULENT

CONVEYANCEs-PosSESSION-A

bank

advanced

money upon a note with the collateral security of twenty-five barrels of
whiskey in the pledgor's bonded warehouse. The pledgee indorsed and delivered the warehouse receipt to the bank. When the pledgor became bankrupt, the bank claimed the whiskey as against the trustee in bankruptcy.
Held: IThe pledge to the bank was good; the transfer of the warehouse rereipts was enough to prevent the conveyance from being fraudulent. Taney
v. Penn National Bank, 34 Supreme Ct. Rep. 289 (U. S. 1914).
The law upon the question of the effect of retention of possession of
the goods by the vendor after the sale is made is in great confusion and each
jurisdiction has its own line of decisions upon the matter. The law, as originally developed in England, was that retention of possession by the vendor
after sale was fraudulent per se, and thus the sale was avoided. Edwards v.
Harben, 2 T. R. 587 (Eng. 1788). This case was soon overruled and the
modern law is that retention of possession by the vendor is only evidence of
fraud. Martindale v. Booth, 3 Barn. & Ad. 498 (Eng. 1832). In this country
some of the States follow the modern English rule: Miller v. Shreve, 29
N. J. L. 250 (1861); Ingalls v. Herrick, io8 Mass. 357 (1871). Pennsylvania,
on the other hand, follows the earlier English rule as laid down in Edwards
v. Harben, supra. Retention of possession by the vendee is conclusive evidence of fraud. Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 275 (18ig). To validate the sale
as to third persons, "there must be such delivery and change of possession attending the transfer as the nature of the property is capable of." Haynes v.
Hunsicker, 26 Pa. 58 (I856); actual if the goods are capable of physical delivery, constructive if they are not. McKibben v. Martin, 64 Pa. 352 (1870).
Constructive delivery takes various forms. Assumption of ownership has
been frequently held a sufficient chahge of possession; of pile of lumber,
Haynes v. Hunsicker, supra; of portable sawmill, Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa.
But the own263 (1891) ; of brick yard, White v. Gunn, 205 Pa. 229 (903).
ership must be exclusive; ownership concurient with the vendor is not
enough: McKibben v. Martin, supra. In other cases, marking the goods
with the vendee's name has been considered a constructive delivery: raft,
Smith v. Crisman, 91 Pa. 428 (1879); machinery, McCullough v. Willey, 20o
Pa. 168 (igoi) ; bags of coffee set aside in warehouse, Riggs v. Bair, 213 Pa.
Symbolical delivery also has been held good: delivery of key of
402 (x9o6).
house in which the goods were stored, Barr v. Reitz, 53 Pa. 256 (1866) ; Goddard v. Weil, i65 Pa. 419 (1895); delivery of keys of safe and of room in
which it was stored for delivery of the safe, Benford v. Schell, 55 Pa. 393
(i86I). The principal case, as the transaction took place in Pennsylvania, is
governed by local law, and the decision appears correct; the transfer cf the
warehouse receipt was a valid constructive delivery, especially as it was the
established custom of the trade to treat the warehouse receipts of whiskey
as the whiskey itself. The opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals on the
former trial of this case contains a very clear summary of the law in Pennsylvania upon this question. Taney v. Penn National Bank, 187 Fed. Rep.
689, 696 (1911).
SPECIFIC PERFORANCE-PERSONALTY-SAUERKRAUT-In

a

suit to compel

specific performance of a contract for the sale of a quantity of sauerkraut
equal to that produced by the seller and-sold to the buyer in 1911, which was
only a fair quality, the bill was dismissed. Held: Sauerkraut is a staple, com-
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mercial commodity whose market value can be easily and accurately ascertained and which the plaintiff could have easily procured, and a court of
equity will not compel the specific performance of a contract for the sale
of personal property unless special circumstances and conditions exist which
render inadequate a suit at law to recover damages for its breach. Lehman
Co. v. Island City Pickle Co., 208 Fed. Rep. coo (Mich. 1913).
It is a matter of course for courts of equity to decree specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of real estate and it does not depend
upon the inadequacy of the legal remedy in the particular case. Cumberledge
v. Brooks, 235 Ill. 249 (1go8); Peer v. Wadsworth, 67 N. J. Eq. 191 (1904) ;
Lighton v. Syracuse, 96 N. Y. S. 692 (19o5); Hammond v. Foreman, 26 S. E.
Rep. 212 (1897). Pennsylvania is contra because of the possibility to obtain
the same results at law. Smaltz's App. 99 Pa. 310 (1882); 5o U. OF PA. L. R.
6s (1902).
On the other hand as a general rule specific performance is not decreed
where the subject matter of the contract is personal property, because in the
case of ordinary chattels, the recovery of damages at law enables the plain,
tiff to purchase the same quantity of like goods. Block v. Shaw, 78 Ark. 5I1
(9o6) ; Dorman v. McDonald, 47 Fla. 252 (1904). In accordance with the
principal case the following articles have been held ordinary articles of commerce: Cotton, Block v. Shaw, supra; cattle, Lumley v. Miller, 119 N. W.
Rep. 1014 (S. D. igog) ; logs or lumber, Neal v. Parker, 98 Md. 254 (9o4);
whiskey, Langford v. Taylor, 99 Va. 577 (19Ol) ; bar-room fixtures, Meehan
v. Owens, 196 Pa. 69 (19oo) ; stocks of groceries, Mesandona v. Burg, 49 La.
Ann. 656 (1897), or fruit, Carolee v. Handelis, io3 Ga. 299 (1898); pianos,
Gillett v. Warren, io N. M. 523 (igoo) ; stock in corporation, Ryan v. McLane,
9I Md. 175 (igoo); Butler v. Wright, I86 N. Y. 259 (19o6).
But even contracts for such articles may be enforced where peculiar circumstances make it difficult for the vendee to obtain similar goods. Eichbaum v. Sample, 213 Pa. 216 (1go6); Curtice Bros. v. Catts, 72 N. J. Eq. 831
(19o7). And contracts will be enforced for unique or rare chattels such as
valuable jars, Falcke v. Gray, 29 L. J. Ch. 28 (Eng. i86o) : an old altar-piece,
Somerset v. Cookson, 3 P.-Wms. 390 (Eng. 1735) ; a painting, Lowther v.
Lowther, 13 Ves. Jr. 95 (Eng. i8o6) ; annuities, Prichard v. Overy, I Jac & W.
396 (Eng. i82o); Harris v. Parry, 215 Pa. 174 (1907) ; stock having no market value and not readily procurable, Fleishman v. Woods, r35 Cal. 256 (Igoi) ;
Eichbaum v. Sample, 213 Pa. 216 (i9o6); ships, Hurd v, Groch, 5i Atl. 278
(N. J. Ch. 1898) ; documents, such as deeds, title-papers, private letters, Fred
v. Fred. 5o Ad. 776 (N. C. Ch. i9oI) ; Dock v. Dock, i8o Pa. 14 (1896); patent
rights and copyrights, Young v. Gilmour, 69 N. Y. S. 191 (i9O) ; Corbin v.
Tracey, 34 Conn. 325 (1867); Cogent v. Gibson, 33 Beav. 557, (Eng. 1864),
and patented articles, Adams v. Messinger, 147 Mass. 185 (1888).
SPECIFIC PERFORMANcE-RIGHTS OF ONE NOT A PARTY TO THE CONTRACT-

The injured judgment creditor cannot compel specific performance of a contract of insurance whereby the judgment debtor was insured against loss
through liability to others. Van Reen v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 2o9 Fed.
Rep. 69

(1913).

The terms of the policy were such that it was held that the insurer incurred no liability until the insured suffered damage, that is, until he satisfied
the judgment. Of course, if there is no liability on the part of the insurer,
no one can compel performance of the contract. Under this interpretation of
such contracts, all efforts to get hold of the insurance money' have proved
futile. Garnishment has failed, for there is no debt owing the assured, since
he has incurred no loss. Allen v. Aetna Insurance Co., 145 Fed. Rep. 881
(i9o6). Assignment is no more effective, for the assignee can have no better
claim than the assured assignor, and he has no right of action until he has
satisfied the judgment. Thompson v, Allen, 12 Ind. 539 (1859). The insurer
is not trustee of a fund for the injured party, and may settle with the as-
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sured without incurring any liability to any third parties. Bains v. Atkins,
181 Mass. 24o (I9O2). Action at law by the injured party as one for whose
benefit a contract was entered into has failed, because the contract is for the
protection of the assured when he has incurred loss and not for the benefit
of the injured party, and because, until the judgment is satisfied, there is,
at all events, no liability on the part of the insurer. Beyer v. International
Aluminum Co., ioi N. Y. S. 83 (19o6).
Directly in accord with the principal case is Frye v. Bath Gas Co., !7 Me. 241 (i9o3).
It is conceivable that the insurer and insured might enter into such a
contract that the insurer agrees to insure against liability, and not only for
damages incurred through liability. Gilbert v. Wiman, I N. Y. 55o (1848).
Under such circumstances, as soon as final judgment has been rendered
against the assured, there is a debt due him from the insurer and this debt
may be garnisheed by the judgment creditor. Anoka Lumber Co. v. Fidelity
& Casualty Co., 63 Minn. 286 (1895) ; Fritchie v. Miller's Extract Co., 197 Pa.
401 (igoo). A contract of insurance substantially identical with the one in
the principal case has been construed to be one of insurance against liability
and the judgment creditor has been given all rights which he would have under a policy clearly one insuring against liability. Sanders v. Frankfort Insurance Co., 72 N. H. 485 (19o4). This case, however seems against the
great weight of authority. Under all these cases it appears that the judgment
creditor could garnishee the insurance company for as great a sum as the
judgment debtor has paid, until the judgment is satisfied.
ToRTs-INDEMNIrr-REcovERx
FRom PARTY PRIMARILY LIABLE-A railroad company was granted a right of way over a certain city street. While
constructing its line of railway, the street was left in a dangerous condition
and a pedestrian received therefrom a severe personal injury for which he
recovered against the city. Suit was instituted by the city to recover over
against the company. Held: The efficient and primary cause of the accident
was the negligence of the defendant for which it is answerable over to the
city. City of Astoria v. Astoria & C. R. R. Co., 136 Pac. Rep. 645 (Ore.
1913).
As a general rule, one wrongdoer who has been forced to pay damages
has no right of contribution from another. This principle is well shown
in a recent case where an injury was received from a defective street, judgment recovered against the municipality and the right to recover over was
denied as against one under contract to keep the street in repair. It was
here said that the city should have repaired the defect and then called upon
the contractor for reimbursement. City of Des Moines v. Barber Asphalt Co.,
208 Fed. Rep. 828 (1913).
The rule as stated above applies only when the wrongdoers are in pari
delicto. If it is shown that one is at fault to a greater extent than the other
or that one is guilty of mere passive negligence, while the direct cause of
the injury is the active negligence of the other, recovery over against the
principal wrongdoer will be allowed. Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R. R. Co.,
4o Mass. 24 (1839). This case is the leading authority upon the subject and
has been cited with approval in all of the later decisions.
Municipalities against which judgments have been rendered in favor of
parties injured on account of defects in streets, may always recover over
against the party whose negligence was the principal and direct cause of the
accident. Waterbury v. Traction Co., 47 Conn. 152 (igol); Brooklyn v.
Brooklyn City R. Co., 57 Barb. 497 (N. Y. 187o). Judgment rendered against
the defendant in the first suit is conclusive upon the person liable over,
provided notice be given to the latter and full opportunity be afforded him
to defend the action. Washington Gas Co. v. Dist. of Columbia, 161 U. S.
316 (1895).
Not only the amount of the judgment may be recovered, but
also all legitimate costs incurred in defending the prior action, including attorVey's fees. Westfield v. Mayo, 122 Mass. ioo (1877),

RECENT CASES
TRADEMARKS-TERRITORIAL EXTENT OF PtOTEcTioN-The complainant corporation adopted in 1872 the words "Tea Rose" to designate a make of
flour which it had been selling since that time, the sales, however, being confined to the territory north of the Ohio River. The defendant corporation
has been selling flour as "Tea Rose" flour since i9O4 in the southeastern
States in ignorance of the trade conducted by the complainant under the same
name. A bill was brought to restrain the defendant from using the name
"Tea Rose" throughout this southeastern district. Held: The decree will
be refused, because complainant is only entitled to protection for his trademark in those districts in which his goods are actually sold. Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 2o8 Fed. Rep. 513 (1913),
The court cites no authorities for this geographical limitation of protection
of a trademark, but considers that the right in a trademark and the right to be
free from unfair competition as so similar that since there is a geographical
limit to the protection granted against unfair competition there should be
the same limitation to trademark protection. The court shows that in both
"trademark" and "unfair competition" cases the injury by infringement is an
injury to trade and maintains that where complainant has no trade in a
particular district he cannot be injured by an infringement of his trademark.
It is submitted that this case cannot be supported either on principle or
by authority. The distinction between the basis of protection of a trademark
and against unfair competition is today clearly established, 62 U, OF P. LAW
Ray. 458. The holder of a valid trademark has property rights in the mark,
and the mere proof of infringement will give him a right to relief, whereas
the protection against unfair competition is predicated on the actual competition of the trade of the two parties, Thus it is obvious that there can
never be protection from unfair competition unless there exists actual competition. A trademark, however, which is a property right, even though
a right inseparably connected with trade, is of little value unless unlimited
in territorial extent. It is an exclusive right, Bissell v. Bissell, 121 Fed.
Rep. 357, 364 (I9O3), and amounts to a monopoly of the name or mark
appropriated. The basis for protection from unfair competition is for these
reasons not analogous to the protection of a trademark and the rules adopted
in the one case should have no application in the other.
The only "trademark cases" cited by the court in the principal case are
m opposition to the decision there reached. Derringer v. Plate, 29 Cal, 292
(1866); Kidd v. Johnson, Ioo U. S. 617 (1879); Hygeia Water Co. v. Ice
Co., r44 Fed. 139 (i9o6); Hopkins on Trademarks, §13, An effort is made
to distinguish them on the ground that they merely support the proposition
that a trademark has no territorial limitation provided the trade with which
it is connected has no such limitation. It is submitted that the language
used in this case does not warrant this conclusion.
TRUSTS-CREATION-VOLUNTARY-WITHOUT

KNOWLEDGE OF BENEFICIARY-

The owner of a note deposited it at a bank assigning it to her son by writing
on the back of it "I hereby assign this note to my son, to be given him at
my death, reserving ownership and control of same, to myself, until that
time"--to which she attached her signature, She died and a dispute arose
over the possession of the note. Held: A trust was created with the bank
as trustee in favor of the son even though he never knew of it, Marshall
v. Marshall, i6o S. W. Rep. 775 (Ky. 1913).
. This is in accord with the general rules of trusts: -First, that where a
donor intends to make a gift by a conveyance to uses or by declaring himself trustee for the donee, equity will enforce such gift only in the manner
in which it was intended, and if it fails in that manner as a gift in that it
was incomplete, it will not be enforced in any other manner. Grover v.
Grover, 24 Pick. 261 (Mass. 1835) ; Notes in Ames Cases on Trusts, pages
I55, 162; Richards v. Delbridge, L. R. iS Eq. iI (Eng. 1874); Lawrence
v. Lawrence, i8I Ill. 248 (1899). Second, a voluntary trust can be enforced
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by the cestui que trust when it is an "executed" voluntary trust, where the
power of revocation which was included was not exercised. Hammerstein v.
Equitable Trust Co., 1o3 N. E. 7o6 (N. Y. i913). Third, the fact that the
donee had no notice or knowledge of the trust during the life of the settler
will not affect the trust. Merigan v. McGonigle, 205 Pa. 321 (19O3); Conn.
Savings Bank v. Albee, 33 Am. St. Rep. 944 (Vt. 1892); Marquette v. Wilkinson, iig Mich. 414 (i8gg); Taylor v. Watkins, 13 So. Rep. 8xi (Miss.
x893) ; Totten v. Satten, 179 N. Y. 112 (I9o4), except in Massachusetts if the
trust is voluntary and donor has not parted with possession. Boynton v.
Gale, 194 Mass. 320 (19o7).
TRUSTS-STATUTE OF FRAUDs-PROOF OF PAROL TRUSTS IN LAND--An
owner of property by deed of bargain and sale, reciting a valuable consideration paid, conveyed to his daughter a tract of land. At the time of
conveyance no consideration was paid, and the daughter took and held the
land with the understanding and agreement that she would hold it in trust
for the grantor's children. This trust was proved by parol. Held: There
was no error for that section of the Statute of Frauds, which requires contracts concerning land to be in writing does not affect the value of trusts
or the evidence by which they are established. Jones v. Jones, 8o S. E. Rep.
43o (N. C. 1913).
This is in accord with the general rule that a trust arising on transmutation of possession, orally declared by the grantor, may be proved by parol
where section seven of English Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. 3, is not in
force. 6i U. OF P. LAW REV. 687. For the States which have adopted this
section of the Statute of Frauds forbidding the proof of parol trusts of
realty, see Ames Cases on Trusts, Vol. I, 176.

